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Prosecuting Members of Defense Legal 
Teams and Its Ethical Implications for the 
Prosecutor: A Proposal for a New Ethical 
Standard 
BELLE YAN 
Abstract 
This Note explores improprieties and conflicts of interest that may arise 
when a prosecutor’s office investigates and files charges against defense 
counsel or a member of the defense legal team. Specifically, this Note 
focuses on such investigations and charges that arise from defense counsel’s 
representation of a defendant whom the same prosecutor’s office is 
prosecuting. The intimately adversarial and professional relationships 
between prosecutors and defense attorneys taint the legitimacy of any 
charges against defense counsel for alleged misconduct. The ethical standard 
proposed here suggests a non-waivable conflict of interest. This would assist 
the prosecutor’s office in avoiding the appearance of impropriety in such a 
prosecution.  It may even legitimize the threat which otherwise may be seen 
as having an intentional chilling effect on the defendant’s legal 
representation. This Note’s proposal is two-fold: First, it analyzes a 
relationship that raises a conflict of interest for prosecutors; and second, it 
guides prosecutors through the processes necessary for the prosecution of 
defense counsel for conduct arising from their legal representation of a client, 
helping them to act in good faith and in the interests of justice. 
 
 
  J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2019.  Thank you to Professor 
Kate Bloch for her guidance and care as my Note supervisor and throughout my time at 
Hastings, and to Professor Stefano Moscato for his mentorship and unwavering support. And 
lastly, a special thank you to Chris Johnson, Cady Broxon, Natalie Franzini, and the editors 
of the Hastings Journal of Crime & Punishment. 
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Introduction 
A public defender investigator arrived at a housing complex, looking 
for a police log from the housing authority police office for an upcoming 
rape trial.1  She walked into the office, inquired about the log, and handed to 
two officers her business card, which identified her as an investigator 
employed by the public defender’s office.  An officer later went to the public 
defender’s office to deliver the piece of evidence sought. 
A few days after the trial ended with a guilty verdict, the New Orleans 
District Attorney’s Office—the same prosecutor’s office that had just 
secured a conviction in the trial—indicted the investigator for impersonating 
a peace officer, specifically a member of the prosecution team.  One of the 
officers with whom the investigator had spoken at the housing authority 
office told an attorney with the housing authority that the investigator 
worked at the prosecutor’s office.  The housing authority attorney then called 
the prosecutor’s office with questions about the case.  As a result, the defense 
investigator was charged in court, arraigned, and had bail set at $50,000.  
This public defender employee was not the only person in her office 
charged by the same prosecutors against whom the office litigates its cases. 
The Guardian’s investigation discovered that the New Orleans District 
Attorney’s Office charged or threatened to charge six public defender 
employees for separate actions taken during the scope of their employment, 
either as an attorney or a part of the legal team representing indigent clients.2 
The investigator fought her case for two years until the court refused to grant 
the prosecution’s fourth request for a continuance, and the prosecutor 
dropped the charge.3 
This is not unique to New Orleans. Defense counsel and public defender 
employees in other jurisdictions have been arrested or charged for conduct 
 
 1. See Della Hasselle, After Delays, DA’s Office Abruptly Drops Charges Against 
Investigator Accused of Posing as Staffer, NEW ORLEANS ADVOC. (Jan. 3, 2017), 
https://www.the advocate.com/new_orleans/news/courts/article_52ca2fc6-d200-11e6-b6b6-
a374cf3f0f61.html; Aviva Shen, Prosecuted by Her Legal Counterpart: ‘It Destroyed my Life 
in so Many Ways’, THE GUARDIAN (May 1, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/201 
7/may/01/prosecuted-law-new-orleans [hereinafter Prosecuted by Her Legal Counterpart]; 
Lorelei Laird, Public Defenders Allege Prosecutor's Office Filing Unwarranted Charges 
Against Them, A.B.A. J. (May 2, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/public_ 
defenders_allege_prosecutors_office_filing_unwarranted_char ges_again; Joshua Vaughn, 
New Orleans Public Defenders Punished for Locating Key Witness, THE APPEAL (Oct. 29, 
2019), https://the appeal.org/new-orleans-defenders-rape-case/ (“citing past situations where 
criminal justice agency employees wound up ‘in handcuffs,’ [Orleans Public Defender chief 
district defender] said his attorneys invoked their right to remain silent only as a precaution.”). 
 2. Prosecuted by Her Legal Counterpart, supra note 1. 
 3. Id.  During the proceedings against her, the investigator left the office to pursue social 
work, but was unable to pursue opportunities to work with children because of her open case).  
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related to their representation of clients.4  For example, a San Francisco 
detective arrested a volunteer deputy public defender for suborning perjury 
after his client testified.5  In another California county, a deputy public 
defender was charged with dissuading a witness after the witness accused 
him of presenting himself as the prosecutor.6  Criminal defense attorneys in 
Chicago were indicted and later acquitted in a bench trial for suborning 
perjury.7  
Criminal cases like these raise questions about prosecutors’ intentions. 
In particular, the collateral consequences of criminal cases underscore the 
impact such charges have on the defendant.  When that defendant is defense 
counsel or a member of the defense legal team, the filing of charges may 
suggest that that action is a trial tactic designed to have a chilling effect on 
the counsel’s ability to zealously represent clients in future cases.  After all, 
prosecutors and defense counsel face each other every day and are repeat 
players in the same courtrooms.8  Facing arrest as a result of courtroom 
conduct carries weighty consequences for defense counsel and their clients 
 
 4. It should be noted that this paper is not a discussion on charges brought against 
attorneys and employees of public defender’s office based on allegations of misconduct 
occurring outside of their representation of their clients. See, e.g., Sonseeahray Tonsall, 
Former Solano County Public Defender Accused of Raping Fellow Attorney, FOX 40 (Aug. 
8, 2018), https://fox40.com/2018/08/08/former-solano-county-public-defender-accused-of-
raping-fellow-attorney.  Rather, this paper will discuss alleged misconduct that is related to 
attorney representation.  See, e.g., Barry Tarlow, The Moral Conundrum of Representing the 
Rat, 19 CHAMPION 15, 16 (1995) (“Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) White . . . . 
claim[ed] that much of Patrick Hallinan's legal representation was intended to further the 
illegal aims of the Mancuso enterprise.”). 
 5. The prosecutor’s office declined to charge the attorney. See Chris Roberts, Turns Out 
SFPD's Go-To Guy on Gangs is a Bit of Bigot, Too, S.F. WEEKLY (May 3, 2016), http://www 
.sfweekly.com/news/turns-out-sfpds-go-to-guy-on-gangs-is-a-bit-of-bigot-too/. 
 6. Jess Sullivan, Judge Hears Probable Cause Case Against Solano Deputy Public 
Defender, DAILY REPUBLIC (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.dailyrepublic.com/all-dr-news/sol 
ano-news/fairfield/judge-hears-probable-cause-case-against-solano-deputy-public-defender/; 
Richard Bammer, Judge Delays Ruling in Witness-Dissuading Case Involving Rookie Deputy 
Public Defender, THE REPORTER (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.thereporter.com/2019/02/15/ 
judge-delays-ruling-in-witness-dissuading-case-involving-rookie-deputy-public-de fender/.  
 7. Assistant United States Attorneys from a different federal district prosecuted the case. 
William R. Coulson, Takeaways from Rare Perjury Prosecution of Attorneys, LAW360 (Aug. 
31, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/696892/takeaways-from-rare-perjury-pro secuti 
on-of-attorneys.  
 8. See Charlese David Phillips & Sheldon Ekland-Olson, Repeat Players in a Criminal 
Court - The Fate of Their Clients, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 530, 531 (1982) (“When we restrict our 
attention to the role of attorneys, we must recognize that one lawyer, the prosecutor, is always 
a repeat-player. Any variations in contact or interaction with the criminal courts come largely 
among members of the defense bar. Some defense lawyers are ‘regulars’; others are almost 
‘one-time players.’”).  
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alike.  In an effort to avoid criminal charges, a defense attorney may be 
forced to change their approach to legal representation, which, in turn, serves 
as a detriment to their clients.  
The unique power of prosecutors to bring criminal charges explains 
why they are guided by specialized ethical standards.9  Rule 4.4 of the 
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“ABA 
Model Rules”) states “a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial 
purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person . . . .”10 
Scholars have addressed how prosecutors use their wide-ranging discretion 
to prosecute as a trial tactic to gain advantages in litigation.11  Literature has 
also discussed how prosecutorial conflicts of interest arise and how they may 
be resolved.12  What is missing, however, is scholarship addressing whether 
the prosecution of defense counsel, or members of the legal defense team, 
creates a conflict of interest when the alleged misconduct arises from a 
criminal proceeding the prosecutor initiated. Similarly, there is little 
guidance about how to mitigate such a conflict.13  
Using established frameworks—the ABA Model Rules and existing 
ABA Criminal Standards for the Prosecution Function—this Note examines 
the ethical ramifications for prosecutors who charge members of the defense 
legal team for conduct arising in the scope of their legal representation.  Part 
I introduces the power a prosecutor has in the different stages of criminal 
proceedings and the prosecutor’s ethical duties.  Part II discusses Bennett L. 
Gershman’s categories of threats from prosecutors and the framework he 
 
 9. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASSN’N, Discussion Draft 
1983).  
 10. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4. 
 11. See generally Bennett L. Gershman, Threats and Bullying by Prosecutors, 46 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 327 (2014) [hereinafter Threats and Bullying]; Note, The Paradox of 
“Progressive Prosecution”, 132 HARV. L. REV. 748 (2018); Gerard E. Lynch, Our 
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998). 
 12. See generally Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts 
of Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV 463 (2017) [hereinafter Rethinking Prosecutor’s Conflicts]; Carrie 
Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes III: Personnel Policies and Conflicts of Interest 
in Prosecutor’s Offices, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53 (2012). 
 13. There is a substantial list of cases on prosecuting attorney’s conflict of interest that 
arises from the relationship with the accused, but those relationships are related to attorney-
client relationships, “past civil litigation” with opposing counsel, “actual or perceived threat 
by defendant against prosecutor[,]” “prosecutor victimized by defendant’s criminal acts[,]” 
and “political confrontation between defendant and prosecutor[.]”  Allen L. Schwartz & 
Danny R. Veilleux, Disqualification of Prosecuting Attorney in State Criminal Case on 
Account of Relationship with Accused, 42 AM. L. REV. 5TH 581 (2018).  Other articles cited 
in this Note also do not address if a conflict of interest arises during the prosecution of defense 
counsel or a member of the defense legal team for alleged misconduct from their 
representation of a client charged by the same prosecutor.  
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designed to explain whether such behavior is ethically legitimate.14  Part III 
identifies examples of prosecutors charging members of a defendant’s legal 
team for conduct undertaken during the scope of that representation and 
discusses how that behavior fits into Gershman’s framework. Part IV 
discusses the effects such threats and charges have on defense legal teams, 
their duty to their clients, and their ability to represent those clients with “zeal 
in advocacy.”15  Lastly, Part V begins with an illustration of the potential 
conflicts of interest that may arise when prosecutors pursue charges against 
defense legal teams for conduct arising from the course of representation, 
and offers guidance on how to resolve and reconcile these conflicts. 
This Note argues that the prosecution of a member of the defense legal 
team by the same prosecutor’s office that opposed that defense team should 
be understood as a conflict of interest. As a result of this conflict, local 
prosecutors’ offices should recuse themselves or be removed from such 
prosecutions.  More generally, this Note proposes a set of conflicts of interest 
guidelines that should be adopted, possibly into the ABA Criminal Standards 
for the Prosecution Function, and applied to prosecutors “to guide decision-
making and conduct.”16  
The Role Prosecutors Play in Charging and Other  
Criminal Proceedings 
A sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship is perhaps the 
best protection against the abuse of power, and the citizen’s safety 
lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with human kindness, who 
seeks truth and not victims, who serves the law and not factional 
purposes, and who approaches his task with humility.17 
 
In 1940, then-Attorney General Robert H. Jackson described the role of 
a federal prosecutor in the pursuit of justice in his landmark speech, “The 
Federal Prosecutor.”18  These words still ring true today. The idea that “[t]he 
prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other 
person in America” is reflected throughout the criminal justice system, 
particularly in the power the prosecutor has to file charges against criminal 
 
 14. Threats and Bullying, supra note 11, at 339.  
 15. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1. 
 16. Rory K. Little, The ABA’s Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the 
Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1116 (2011). 
 17. Robert H. Jackson, Attorney Gen. of the U.S., The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the 
Second Annual Conference of U.S. Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 24 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 18 
(1940), 31 J. CRIM. L. 3 (1940). 
 18. Id.  
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defendants.19 Jackson professed that this power is tempered by the ability of 
prosecutors to enforce and police their own exercise of power. 
Responsibilities of a Local Prosecutor 
The responsibilities of a local prosecutor can be categorized into 
commencement, investigative, and adjudicative roles,20 three roles that are 
“sequential and interwoven[.]”21  This culminates to the trial prosecutor’s 
main goal, to “provide a fair trial.”22  Society “can—and ha[s]—promised 
fairness. And the prosecutor’s job is to fulfill that promise.”23  
After receiving information from some law enforcement entity, or 
because of their own investigation, prosecutors decide whether to bring 
criminal charges against a person.24  This power over the criminal process 
continues with every decision point in the case’s investigation and 
advancement through the judicial proceedings.  In preparation for, and at 
each court appearance, both the prosecutor and defense attorney strategize 
to determine the next step.  In lieu of litigating motions the defendant brings 
before the court, or going to trial, the prosecutor has the power to dispose of 
the case. Perhaps the prosecutor will dismiss the case in the interest of 
justice.  More likely, the prosecutor will try to plea bargain, when he wields 
most, if not all, of the power.25 
From commencement to investigation and trial, the prosecutor has 
many opportunities to assert his discretionary power.  While interwoven, the 
distinct phases of prosecution may allow for different attorneys to appear at 
different phases of the case.  Thus, there need not be a single prosecutor who 
follows a case from beginning to end.  The power the prosecutor wields at 
different junctures also creates opportunities for the prosecutor to overstep 
ethical boundaries to succeed in resolving a case or to rectify actions that 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a 
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1697-98 (2000) [hereinafter Uviller, The 
Neutral Prosecutor]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. People v. Force, 39 Cal. App. 5th 506, 508 (2019) (“Fairness is the sine qua non of 
the criminal justice system, and no amount of technical brilliance or advocative skill can make 
up for a failure to provide it.”). 
 23. Id.  
 24. Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor, supra note 20, at 1697-98. 
 25. Studies have shown that more than 95% of criminal cases end up in negotiated 
disposition. LINDSEY DEVERS, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING RESEARCH SUMMARY 1 (Dep’t 
J, Bureau of Just. Assistance, Nov. 2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBarg 
ainingResearchSummary.pdf (“[S]cholars estimate that about 90 to 95 percent of both federal 
and state court cases are resolved through this process.”). 
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may be tainted by an appearance of impropriety.  
Ethical Duties of a Local Prosecutor 
In performing their responsibilities, prosecutors are also informed by 
their state’s code of ethics or professional responsibility.  While not every 
state has adopted the ABA Model Rules in full, each state has codified its 
own ethical codes and guidelines that all attorneys in that jurisdiction must 
rely upon.26  The Model Rules clearly articulate the special responsibilities 
prosecutors have, acknowledging the unique role prosecutors play in the 
justice system.27  The ABA has also adopted guidelines for prosecutors, the 
Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function (“The Standards”). 
The Standards are “intended to provide guidance for the professional 
conduct and performance of prosecutors [but] are aspirational or describe 
‘best practices,’ and are not intended to serve as the basis for the imposition 
of professional discipline.”28  The National District Attorneys Association 
also publishes standards to supplement existing rules.29  Together, these rules 
and standards guide prosecutors in their practice.  
Conflict of interest rules exist an area in which ethical standards do not 
fully consider prosecutors, despite a specific section that enumerate 
prosecutorial ethics.  Both the ABA Model Rules and The Standards define 
and direct prosecutors in how to identify and address conflicts of interest 
when the attorney has some relationship with a client or responsibilities to a 
third party.  A concurrent conflict of interest exists if “there is a significant 
risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited 
by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third 
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”30  The comment explains that 
“if the probity of a lawyer’s own conduct in a transaction is in serious 
question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client 
detached advice.”31  However, a plain language reading of these rules causes 
 
 26. Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, A.B.A. (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_
of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules; see Bruce A. Green, 
Developing Standards of Conduct for Prosecutors and Criminal Defense Lawyers, 62 
HASTINGS L.J. 1093, 1093 (2011). 
 27. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8.  
 28. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.1(b) (4th ed. 
2015).  
 29. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEY’S ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS (3rd ed. with 
rev. commentary 2009), https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/NDAA-NPS-3rd-Ed.-w-Rev 
ised-Commentary.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS].  
 30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2). 
 31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 10. 
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concerns about how they apply to prosecutors because the ABA Model Rules 
about conflicts of interest pertain to former or current clients.32  Prosecutors 
are believed to represent the People, not a specific client, which makes the 
concept of conflict of interest distinct from that of defense attorneys.33  
While the ABA Model Rules governing conflicts of interest focus on 
government attorneys more generally, the Standards further explain how 
these conflicts of interest rules apply to criminal prosecutors: “prosecutorial 
conflicts of interest can include any personal or professional interests, 
relationships, or beliefs that might lead prosecutors to act in their own self-
interest or in others’ interest, rather than disinterestedly.”34  Abiding by the 
standards of professional conduct requires prosecutors to avoid any 
appearances of impropriety.35  Most relevant to the choice to prosecute an 
individual with whom the prosecutor has some relationship, Standard 3-
1.7(f) provides that 
 
[t]he prosecutor should not permit the prosecutor’s 
professional judgment or obligations to be affected by the 
prosecutor’s personal, . . . professional, . . . or other interests or 
relationships. A prosecutor should not allow interests in personal 
advancement or aggrandizement to affect judgments regarding what 
is in the best interests of justice in any case.36  
 
The National Prosecution Standards suggest that a prosecutor should 
excuse himself when “a fair-minded, objective observer [would] conclude 
that the prosecutor’s neutrality, judgment, or ability to administer the law in 
an objective manner may be compromised.”37  Together, these Standards 
suggest prosecutors should identify any preexisting relationships with the 
accused and their defense counsel, and consider whether that relationship 
undermines the prosecutors’ neutrality during the commencement, 
investigation, and adversarial stages.  
While the list is not exhaustive, these standards highlight the unique 
position prosecutors are in without traditional clients and provide guidance 
 
 32. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7-1.9.  
 33. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.3 (“The 
prosecutor generally serves the public and not any particular government agency, law 
enforcement officer or unit, witness or victim.”); Rethinking Prosecutor’s Conflicts, supra 
note 12, at 471. 
 34. Rethinking Prosecutor’s Conflicts, supra note 12, at 472.  
 35. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(a); Rethinking 
Prosecutor’s Conflicts, supra note 12, at 472. 
 36. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.7(f).  
 37. NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 29, § 1-3.3. 
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in navigating the discretion and power prosecutors have in performing the 
prosecutorial function. One area that deserves more examination is the 
discretion of prosecutors to employ threats despite an ABA Model Rule that 
proscribes them. 
The Legitimacy of Prosecutor’s Threats and Bullying 
Threats by prosecutors are pervasive in the criminal justice system and 
have ethical implications. In Threats and Bullying by Prosecutors, Bennett 
L. Gershman considers prosecutors’ “ability to threaten, intimidate, and 
embarrass anyone—defendants, witnesses, lawyers—without any 
accountability, or apology” to be “one of the most prominent features of U.S. 
prosecutors[.]”38  While courts may find some threats “legally permissible[, 
that] does not necessarily mean that the threat is an appropriate form of 
prosecutorial behavior.”39  Some courts may even encourage these threats.40   
Gershman analyzes ten categories of what he terms as “threats and 
bullying”: intimidating grand jury witnesses, coercing guilty pleas, attacking 
defense witnesses, bullying defense witnesses, bullying prosecution 
witnesses, compelling waiver of civil rights claim, retaliation, demagoguery, 
shaming, and coercing corporate cooperation.41 Gershman utilizes 
hypotheticals drawn from real-life examples to illustrate each one of these 
categories to demonstrate the difficulty of “attempting to draw a clear line 
between permissible and impermissible threats.”42  
Particularly, his examples of prosecuting a defense expert witness and 
threatening a defense co-participant witness exhibit the lengths to which 
prosecutors have gone to deter defense witnesses from testifying in present 
or future cases.  In the defense expert witness example, a forensic pathologist 
offered testimony that criticized the prosecution’s legal theory—the 
scientific veracity of Shaken Baby Syndrome.43  The defendant was later 
acquitted of the murder charge.  Shortly after, the prosecutor charged the 
defense expert witness with perjury for giving false testimony about his 
credentials, though he was later acquitted.44  Gershman questions whether 
 
 38. Threats and Bullying, supra note 11, at 328.  
 39. Id. at 330.  
 40. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that where a prosecutor carries out a 
threat to reindict a defendant on more serious charges if the defendant refuses to plead guilty 
to the original charges there is no due process violation.  Threats and Bullying, supra note 11, 
at 330, n.19 (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)).  
 41. Threats and Bullying, supra note 11, at 331-37. 
 42. Id. at 339.  
 43. Id. at 333. 
 44. Id. at 333, 340. 
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these charges “were brought to silence an outspoken prosecution critic.”45  
Gershman also examines the experience of a defense co-participant 
witness, whose case was dismissed because she was a juvenile.46  She had 
planned on testifying for the defendant.47  The prosecutor then contacted the 
defense attorney to warn the co-participant that if she testified, the dismissed 
charges would be reinstated, among other consequences. The prosecutor 
served a subpoena on the co-participant-witness and had three federal agents 
bring the juvenile into his office, where he again warned her that she would 
be prosecuted for her conduct. Gershman questions whether the 
“prosecutor’s conduct in warning [the co-participant witness] of the 
consequences of her testifying was proper.”48 Both these examples 
demonstrate the constitutional concerns stemming from the prosecutor’s 
ability to intrude on defense counsel’s ability to put on a defense and call 
witnesses to testify on behalf of the defendant.49 
Gershman further explores the tactic of shaming.  When investigating 
an investment banker, a prosecutor threatened to charge a banker after the 
banker claimed to be unable to reveal any information incriminating his 
employers.50  The next week, federal agents arrested the banker at his place 
of business, “forcibly escort[ing] him off the trading floor” in handcuffs.51 
Reporters and photographers waited outside for the banker, creating a “perp 
walk” scene.  The “perp walk” tip-off demonstrates the influence prosecutors 
have in shaping public perception of cases they bring.52  
Not all threats are egregious or proscribed. Threats that promote a 
legitimate law enforcement objective may be reasonable.  Some “threats and 
incidents of bullying might appear as a necessary, if overly aggressive, 
means of investigating and prosecuting crime.”53  Prosecutors may use their 
“considerable leverage . . . to induce people to assist law enforcement.”54  
For example, providing immunity to witnesses to testify for the prosecution 
 
 45. Id. at 334. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, . . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor . . . . for his defense.”); Threats and Bullying, supra note 11, at 341 (“threats that drive 
defense witnesses off the stand burden the defendant’s right to compulsory process”).  
 50. Threats and Bullying, supra note 11, at 337.  
 51. Id. 
 52. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.10 
(“Relationship with the Media”).  
 53. Threats and Bullying, supra note 11, at 329.  
 54. Id. at 330.  
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has been found constitutional.55  Gershman highlights the importance of the 
effectiveness of threats: when threats are made, they must aim to achieve the 
justice the prosecution is seeking.  
The absence of clear professional guidelines to delineate what is 
legitimate prompts Gershman to introduce a framework to determine the 
legitimacy of prosecutors’ threats and bullying.  His test is as follows:  
In order for a prosecutor’s threat to be legally and ethically legitimate: 
(1) there must be a legal basis for the threat; (2) the prosecutor must have a 
good faith belief that the individual has the ability to comply; (3) the 
prosecutor must reasonably believe that the threat will cause the individual 
to comply; (4) and the prosecutor must reasonably believe that the need for 
the threat in light of legitimate law enforcement interests outweighs any 
burden on the rights, interests, and sensibilities of the person threatened.56 
This framework is premised on the idea that the prosecution can use 
threats to control and persuade the receiving ends of these threats to do what 
the prosecution wants.57  But courts may find such tactics impermissible 
when a threat burdens the constitutional rights of the accused.  
The components of Gershman’s test are not elements, such as in a crime 
or a tort, where each must be met, but rather factors to be considered in 
determining legitimacy under a factual basis approach. Applying the 
framework to the case of the defense expert witness demonstrates how all of 
the factors need not to fail in order to find a prosecutorial threat to be a 
“gratuitous exercise of unconstrained power and evince an all-out effort to 
insult, humiliate, and intimidate. . . .”58  Indeed, Gershman’s discussion of 
the factors indicates that they are to be considered qualitatively. First, the 
“legal basis for the charges is minimal”59 and “the prosecutor’s good faith 
purpose clearly is suspect.”60  Charging the expert witness with perjury after 
the defendant was acquitted “suggest[ed] that the prosecutor’s motive was to 
retaliate against the expert and silence him.”61  This is particularly egregious 
 
 55. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
 56. Threats and Bullying, supra note 11, at 339.  
 57. Id. (“These cases expose, in different ways, the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s 
awesome powers, and how bullying tactics can enhance or supplement the prosecutor’s 
already virtually unlimited and uncontrolled discretion.”). 
 58. Id. at 340.  
 59. Id. It is important that the first factor is not a binary yes-or-no: “the prosecutor is not 
obliged to file or maintain all criminal charges which the evidence might support.” 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.4(a).  
 60. Threats and Bullying, supra note 11, at 340. 
 61. Id. (citing Mark Hansen, Battle of the Expert: A Forensic Pathologist Successfully 
Fights Criminal Charges Stemming from His Testimony in a Shaken Baby Case, A.B.A. J., 
Dec. 2005, at 56-57).  
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because, along with the minimal legal basis of the charges, the prosecutor 
was no longer trying to stop the witness from testifying in this Shaken Baby 
Syndrome case.  Instead, the prosecutor’s actions suggest he was attempting 
to cause a chilling effect on this expert witness that would dissuade him, and 
to warn other expert witnesses, from testifying for the defense in the future. 
Lastly, Gershman argues that “the impact on the expert’s right to pursue his 
calling and provide critical testimony for a defendant charged with murder 
outweighs any arguable interest by the prosecutor in vindicating the rule of 
law or exposing perjury.”62  Gershman’s framework is a tool to understand 
whether certain prosecutorial threats are legitimate. Threats used to 
“discover probative evidence of crime,” or to “serve valid law-enforcement 
interests” may be more likely to be legitimate.63  Other threats, though, are 
“abusive, humiliating, and involve the gratuitous infliction of harm [and] 
resemble the conduct of a bully”64 and do little to further the legitimate 
purpose of the prosecution. 
While Gershman’s article explores ten different ways prosecutors 
have threatened voluntary or involuntary participants of the criminal justice 
system, one category remains absent.  This category will be discussed in 
Part III.  
Prosecutors Charging Opposing Counsel for  
Criminal Conduct during Scope of Employment  
Gershman identifies a host of categories and challenges to the 
prosecution threatening various participants in the criminal justice system. 
His framework does not address, however, the subject of this paper: charging 
opposing counsel or members of their team with criminal conduct that 
allegedly arose during the course of the representation of their client.  While 
Gershman discusses the charging of defense witnesses for perjury after they 
have testified,65 he does not scrutinize how the prosecution can inquire into 
an attorney’s role in such perjury.  
Prosecuting a member of a defense legal team should be considered a 
threat or bullying under Gershman’s framework. As indicated in the 
Introduction, criminal defense attorneys and investigators have been accused 
of crimes as a result of their representation of clients, including suborning 
perjury, intimidating witnesses, obstructing justice, and dissuading a witness 
from reporting.  Such prosecutions cause the same fears that prosecuting a 
 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 343-44. 
 64. Id. at 344.  
 65. Id. at 333. 
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defense expert witness does: it forces an attorney or other members of the 
defense team to consider the risk of prosecution by opposing counsel and the 
office prosecuting their client.  Prosecuting a member of the defense legal 
team also may have a shaming effect even prior to a conviction.  Newspapers 
and other media show that there is a particular public interest in cases.66  
These possibilities raise similar concerns to what Gershman emphasizes in 
his ten categories.  
The decision to charge an attorney falls within H. Richard Uviller’s 
“commencement” stage. Unlike most state-level cases that come to the 
prosecutor’s attention from law enforcement,67 the prosecutor would most 
likely become suspicious of alleged misconduct directly through their 
prosecution of the defendant whom the defense attorney represents. This 
means that the prosecutor’s office itself would investigate the alleged 
misconduct and interview the related district attorney investigator or deputy 
district attorney—the same individuals who are prosecuting the case in 
which the misconduct occurred. If the charging prosecutor believed that 
there was sufficient evidence to charge the defense attorney,68 the office 
would then file charges.  The case would be assigned to the prosecutor who 
handled the original case or be handed off to another prosecutor in the office. 
Consequently, this person would also be a colleague or coworker of the 
initial prosecutor.  
Consider the following hypothetical. Imagine that the fictional 
Jefferson County District Attorney’s Office charges John Smith with one 
count of burglary, entering a residence with an occupant, colloquially known 
as a “hot prowl.”69  A deputy district attorney, David Powers, is assigned to 
prosecute the case.  A deputy public defender, Catherine Riggs, is assigned 
to represent John Smith.  The Jefferson County District Attorney’s Office 
and Public Defender’s Office have had a contentious relationship, a 
relationship cultivated from attorneys working hundreds, if not thousands, of 
cases against each other in the same courthouse with gamesmanship and 
suspicion.  
When investigating the hot prowl, the public defender calls the 
neighbor, who claims he heard sounds of windows breaking.  Riggs 
 
 66. See Hasselle, supra note 1; see also Prosecuted by Her Legal Counterpart, supra note 
1; see also Laird, supra note 1; see also Vaughn, supra note 1; see also supra text 
accompanying note 4; see also supra text accompanying note 5; see also Sullivan, supra note 
6; see also Bammer, supra note 6; see also supra text accompanying note 7; see also Coulson, 
supra note 7. 
 67. Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor, supra note 20, at 1702. 
 68. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (a); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.3(a). 
 69. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459, 460(a). 
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identifies herself as the public defender representing Smith and explains that 
the deputy district attorney may call the neighbor to testify to the sounds he 
heard.  When the neighbor asks Riggs if she will also ask him questions and 
what kind of questions she would ask, she answers truthfully that at trial she 
would have an opportunity to cross-examine him and ask him questions 
about his hearing.70  Unbeknownst to all, the neighbor has an unreasonable 
fear of talking about his ears or hearing. Later, during a phone call with 
Powers, the neighbor tells him that he spoke with Riggs.  He was scared to 
come to court and refuses to come testify even if subpoenaed. Powers, 
influenced by his past interactions with Riggs speaking to other government 
witnesses, believes that Riggs may have intimidated the neighbor from 
testifying.  The trial commences and results in an acquittal for Smith.  
Powers initiates an investigation into the interaction Riggs has with the 
neighbor, and ultimately, the Jefferson County District Attorney’s Office 
charges Riggs for witness intimidation because the office believes the 
charges are supported by probable cause.71  The case is assigned to James 
Chan, another deputy district attorney who trained with Powers when they 
first started in the office, to prosecute the case.  Here, Riggs is charged with 
a crime that arises from her representation of Smith because she is being 
charged with something that allegedly occurred when interviewing alleged 
witnesses of the hot prowl.  
Applying Gershman’s four-factor framework to determine the 
legitimacy of the threat or bullying is a fact-intensive inquiry and requires a 
careful analysis of the facts the prosecution brings to the court. In examining 
this hypothetical through Gershman’s framework, the discussion is most 
analogous to the example of the expert witness. First, the legal basis is de 
minimus: it is unclear if Riggs said anything untrue to the neighbor or if she 
knew her comments would cause the neighbor to refuse to testify.  It would 
be reasonable to allege that Riggs’s motive to discourage the witness from 
testifying was to help her client.  But if the neighbor refuses to testify, Riggs 
cannot be blamed for truthfully explaining how the adversarial process 
 
 70. Assume that Ms. Riggs followed the rules set out in MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 4.3 (“Dealing with Unrepresented Person”).  See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.3 (4th ed. 2015) (“Relationship with Witnesses”); 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-1.1(b) (“Defense counsel should 
not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law or offer false evidence, to . . . . witnesses, 
or third party. It is not a false statement for defense counsel to suggest inferences that may 
reasonably be drawn from the evidence.”). 
 71. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.3(a) (“prosecutor should seek or file criminal charges only if 
the prosecutor reasonably believes that the charges are supported by probable cause, that 
admissible evidence will be sufficient to support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the decision to charge is in the interests of justice). 
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operates and her role in zealously representing her client, even if her 
explanation resulted in refusal.  
Second, whether Riggs has the ability to comply raises the question of 
what she would be expected to comply with.  This is similar to the defense 
expert witness example.  The hot prowl trial has already been adjudicated. 
Riggs can no longer cooperate by encouraging the witness to obey the 
subpoena as the original case has since ended.  
The next factor, “the prosecutor must reasonably believe that the threat 
will cause the individual to comply[,]” may be implicated in terms of what 
Riggs will do in future trials.  Being prosecuted for witness intimidation will 
certainly influence how Riggs will speak to prosecution witnesses in the 
future.  She will also likely consider sending someone else to interview 
witnesses rather than going to witnesses personally. 
Lastly, weighing the legitimacy of law enforcement interests with the 
burdens placed upon Riggs lean toward describing the threats as gratuitous.72 
Punishing those who intimidate witnesses is a legitimate law enforcement 
interest.”73  It supports the prosecutorial function and its ability to present 
informed cases before a jury.  
The burden on Riggs is great, however, because of the conflict that 
arises and the constitutional consequences to Riggs’ client. Chan, the 
prosecutor on Riggs’s case, is a colleague of Powers, the first attorney who 
first brought attention to the alleged misconduct.  Chan may also have a 
professional relationship with Riggs through their interactions as opposing 
counsel in the same county.  These relationships are governed by Standard 
3-1.7(f), that the prosecutor should not allow their professional judgment to 
be clouded by personal or professional relationships.74  Furthermore, if Riggs 
had been charged during the prosecution of her client, Smith, then such 
charges would have likely disqualified Riggs from representing him.75 
Disqualification interferes with his right to a speedy trial as well as the 
assistance of counsel when another attorney is appointed to represent them.76 
These considerations outweigh the fact that this was a single witness Powers 
believed Riggs spoke to inappropriately. Perhaps Powers could have 
persuaded the neighbor to testify if Riggs spoke to the neighbor again about 
what would happen in court in a more sympathetic way.  Here, it is not so 
 
 72. Threats and Bullying, supra note 11, at 339. 
 73. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.1.  
 74. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.7(f).  
 75. See, e.g., United States v. Greig, 967 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1992) (An actual 
conflict existed because “counsel was in the position of simultaneously having to defend 
himself as well as his client regarding their potentially criminal activity.”). 
 76. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
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clear that the legitimate law enforcement interest to deter witness 
intimidation is outweighed by the burdens on the persons threatened.  
While Gershman does not include the prosecution of members of the 
defense team as one of his categories, such a tactic can be analyzed through 
his framework.  Just as his other ten categories raise intended and unintended 
consequences on the rights of criminal defendants and the ability of attorneys 
to present a defense for the accused, prosecuting members of the defense 
legal team also creates chilling effects on both the member of the legal team 
as well as the team’s ability to represent the client. 
Chilling Effect on Legal Representation of Criminal Defendants  
After applying Gershman’s framework to ascertain the legitimacy of a 
threat, deciding whether a threat is permissible prompts a consideration of 
the full ramifications of the threat or actual prosecution of a member of the 
defense legal team.  “Unquestionably, the mere filing of a charge can have 
devastating consequences on a person’s life, liberty, and reputation.”77  The 
social condemnation of criminal defendants is well noted, but there are 
special considerations when an attorney is indicted or charged.  Furthermore, 
the prosecution of such a member of a legal team also directly affects the 
representation of a client.  All of these consequences must be taken into 
consideration when analyzing the second and third prong, what would 
encourage an individual to comply if they had the ability, and the fourth 
prong, how the threat burdens the “rights, interests, and sensibilities” of the 
person threatened.78  
Attorney’s Individual Consequences of Being Arrested and/or Charged 
Today, different methods induce societal condemnation of those 
arrested and charged regardless of whether those criminal proceedings result 
in a conviction. Media reports of allegations risk shaming the defense 
attorney and their place of employment when identified.79  This is 
compounded by the particular crimes with which prosecutors might charge 
a defense attorney and collateral consequences that follow merely from the 
 
 77. Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in the Charging 
Function, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1259, 1271 (2011).  
 78. Threats and Bullying, supra note 11, at 339.  
 79. See Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism 
and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2162-63 
(2011) (“[S]haming punishments denote state-sponsored punishments that are aimed at 
humiliating the offender by degrading the offender’s status, that is by communicating to 
others that he is a bad type . . . . [S]haming punishments occur before the public eye, 
sometimes with the public’s participation.”). 
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charge itself.  For example, mugshots of those arrested and booked end up 
as part of an individual’s digital footprint with very limited recourse to take 
down those photos.80  Arrests appear on an arrestee’s criminal record, which 
may come up during background checks during the onboarding process for 
a new job.  Even some post-conviction remedies will not completely remove 
an arrest from someone’s record.81  
Furthermore, attorneys face even greater consequences when they have 
been charged with a crime.  Suborning perjury and witness intimidation are 
the very charges that go to the heart of the moral character of an attorney. 
Some state bar associations require licensed attorneys within their 
jurisdiction to self-report incidents when the attorney has been indicted for 
felonies.82  Some bar associations require more, placing an affirmative duty 
on prosecutors to notify the state bar association when they file felonies or 
misdemeanor charges against an attorney.83  This provides even greater 
power to the prosecutor: not only can the prosecutor charge a defense 
attorney with a crime, but also to report that very attorney to the state bar 
association for discipline.  Such report may initiate disciplinary proceedings.  
Returning to our hypothetical: if Riggs were charged with a felony, she 
may need to report the charge to the state bar.  Her arrest and charge will 
remain on her criminal record until she is eligible to have it expunged.  Her 
 
 80. See, e.g., Eumi K. Lee, Monetizing Shame: Mugshots, Privacy, and the Right to 
Access, 70 RUTGERS UNIV. L. REV. 557 (2018); see also Sarah Esther Lageson, It’s Time for 
the Mug-Shot Digital Economy to Die, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://slate.com/ 
technology/2019/03/mug-shot-economy-cuomo-proposal.html.  
 81. Those asking the court to determine factual innocence, one of the very few remedies 
to remove an arrest completely off a person’s record, face almost insurmountable odds in 
succeeding. See Natalie Lyons, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent: California Penal 
Code Section 851.8 and the Injustice of Imposing a Factual Innocence Standard on Arrested 
Persons, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 485, 519 (2013) (“By imposing this substantial burden 
on the [factual innocence] petitioner, the statute ensures that successful petitions under its 
purview are ‘rare’ and that most arrested persons will be barred from its remedy.”).  
 82. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(o)(4); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 
6068(o)(5) (“The conviction of the attorney. . . of . . . a misdemeanor committed in the course 
of the practice of law, or in a manner in which a client of the attorney was the victim, or a 
necessary element of which, . . . involves improper conduct of an attorney, including 
dishonesty or other moral turpitude, or an attempt or a conspiracy or solicitation of another to 
commit a felony or a misdemeanor of that type.”).  
 83. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6101(b); see generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
r. 8.3(a) (“A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate 
professional authority.”); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer’s Duty to Report Another Lawyer’s 
Unethical Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 977, 978 (1988); Douglas 
R. Richmond, The Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Practical Analysis of Lawyer 
Self-regulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175 (1999).  
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whole office rallies behind her but is now implementing resource-heavy 
procedures for all of their cases to ensure two people are on every phone call 
with witnesses. Newspapers write about her case, notifying her family, 
friends, and colleagues about the pending case.84  Riggs is concerned about 
her own future, whether she will be convicted on these charges and how these 
charges will affect her career even if the charges are later dismissed or she is 
acquitted.  
The defense attorney facing criminal charges is at risk of losing her 
liberty. Even if acquitted, she would still face a barrage of collateral 
consequences to her both as an individual and as an attorney.  Studies show 
that arrest records, even with only one arrest, may negatively affect potential 
employers’ consideration of job applications.85 A state bar disciplinary 
committee hearing these cases may issue a disposition that results in the 
attorney being suspended or disbarred, which may be publicly disclosed on 
the bar website or the attorney’s bar profile.86  Being charged with these 
crimes cause great personal consequences for attorneys.  
Consequences on How Defense Attorneys Will Represent Clients  
To avoid such personal consequences, defense attorneys may act 
differently in their legal representation to avoid any chances that they could 
be prosecuted for such crimes.  Such actions could be considered a personal 
conflict of interest, when the lawyer’s own interest in the case materially 
limits her representation.87  This is particularly troubling because if 
attorneys, acting lawfully, allow the risk or chance of intensive scrutiny by 
the prosecutor’s office to affect their representation of their clients, this may 
affect the level of assistance the lawyers provide.  This directly implicates 
the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to the accused of assistance of counsel.88  
Even if the prosecution of the attorney occurs after the attorney’s 
representation concludes, the prosecution of that attorney may influence how 
that attorney or her colleagues act in the future, potentially impacting the 
constitutional rights of other defendants.  
 
 84. See Markel, supra note 79. 
 85. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a)-(b). 
 86. Even if the attorney were acquitted of all charges in criminal court, a disciplinary 
hearing may conclude differently because such a hearing requires different evidentiary rules 
and standards of proof.  See R. OF PROC. OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL. R. 5.104(c) (“The hearing 
need not be conducted according to technical rules relating to evidence and witnesses” with 
exceptions.); see generally David M. Appel, Attorney Disbarment Proceedings and the 
Standard of Proof, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275 (1995).  
 87. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7. 
 88. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
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The chilling effects are magnified further by the fact that many defense 
attorneys are appointed by the court to provide legal representation for 
indigent clients.  Public defenders and private criminal defense attorneys 
contracted to the county or state to provide services are notoriously limited 
by the budget provided by local or state government and the court to provide 
such services.89 Caseloads may be overwhelming.90  If solutions they 
implement consume more resources that otherwise could be spent on 
providing a more thorough investigation for the client’s case, then the risk of 
being charged will also have directly affected the representation of that 
client.  Recording contacts with witnesses and documenting the interaction 
that transpires may also raise defense discovery issues.91  Some 
commonplace solutions that could be implemented include having two 
investigators interview witnesses, having witnesses sign a form 
acknowledging they understand they are speaking to public defender staff, 
or avoiding interviewing the witness at all.92  
To minimize personal consequences, attorneys may also become 
concerned writing declarations because of the risk of being prosecuted for 
perjury.  Attorneys submit declarations to the court that state facts they 
personally know or facts based on information and belief; however, 
declaration must be signed under the penalty of perjury.93  Attorneys learn 
of these facts from their client, or some other witness.  However, attorneys 
may be at risk of being prosecuted of perjury, if unbeknownst to them, those 
facts are not true.  This requires attorneys to be more careful about asserting 
facts, or investing resources of investigators or paralegals to confirm and 
document those facts before submitting such a declaration.  Those resources 
could have gone to a different part of that client’s representation.  
Actions taken by the defense bar to avoid any chances of prosecution 
may impact the defense legal team’s ability to competently and effectively 
 
 89. See, e.g., Teresa Wiltz, Public Defenders Fight Back Against Budget Cuts, Growing 
Caseloads, PEW (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/ 
stateline/2017/11/21/public-defenders-fight-back-against-budget-cuts-growing-caseloads; 
see also Oliver Laughland, The Human Toll of America's Public Defender Crisis, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/07/public-defen 
der-us-criminal-justice-system. 
 90. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-4.4(a); STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1.8(c) (“Publicly-funded defense entities should 
inform governmental officials of the workload of their offices, and request funding and 
personnel that are adequate to meet the defense caseload.”).  
 91. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.3. 
 92. These cautionary measures are burdensome and may deter witnesses wanting to speak 
to defense attorneys.  See Prosecuted by Her Legal Counterpart, supra note 1; see also Laird, 
supra note 1. 
 93. 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (1948) (“Unsworn Declarations Under Penalty of Perjury”). 
5 - Yan_HJCP1-1.docx 12/5/2019  1:58 PM 
154 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 1:1 
assist in the representation of their client.  Such impacts may directly raise 
constitutional concerns.  
The Proposed Solution 
As demonstrated by Gershman’s framework, charging defense 
attorneys and other members of the defense legal team for crimes such as 
suborning perjury or intimidating witnesses could be considered legitimate, 
depending on the context.  Prosecutors should not be discouraged from 
pursuing justice and prosecuting cases they believe have merit.  Defense 
attorneys who overstep ethical bounds should not be immune from 
prosecution.  There is always opportunity for rogue agents.  
Current professional standards, however, do not provide enough 
guidance as demonstrated by how such a threat or actual prosecution raises 
questions about illegitimacy or bullying under Gershman’s framework. In 
fact, Gershman argues professional “disciplinary bodies probably would 
acknowledge that attempting to draw a clear line between permissible and 
impermissible threats is either too difficult or unmanageable.”94  But rather 
than relying on rules of professional conduct with which attorneys comply 
and disciplinary bodies regulate, guidance articulated in the Criminal 
Standards for the Prosecution Function better provides the “best practices” 
standard for prosecutors to navigate the permissibility of threats.95  
These standards already provide a framework for prosecutorial conflicts 
of interest.  Standard 3-1.7 refers to the following situations regarding the 
prosecutor’s relationship to the accused: when the prosecutor represents the 
defendant,96 when the accused is involved with a matter that the prosecutor 
previously participated in as a non-prosecutor,97 when the prosecutor 
formerly represented the now-accused,98 or when the prosecutor is in 
negotiation for private employment with the accused or a person under 
investigation.99 These categories do not include when the prosecutor’s 
relationship with the accused is opposing counsel or a defense legal team 
member.  
Furthermore, Standard 3-1.7(f), which suggests prosecutors should not 
allow their personal or professional relationships to affect their professional 
judgment, provides minimal and vague guidance on the intimacy of the 
relationship or precisely how a prosecutor’s professional judgment should 
 
 94. Threats and Bullying, supra note 11, at 338-39.  
 95. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.1(b). 
 96. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.7(b). 
 97. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.7(c). 
 98. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.7(d). 
 99. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.7(e).  
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not be affected.  The professional relationship of a prosecutor to opposing 
counsel affects the professional judgment required to decide whether to 
charge defense counsel. The standard, however, underemphasizes this 
professionally intimate yet adversarial relationship.  
Criminal defense attorneys, whether court-appointed or retained, and 
their staff are the counterparts of the prosecution.  The very fact that they are 
same repeat players in the same courtroom, interacting with one another in 
an adversarial relationship, raises serious questions of personal and 
professional relationships prosecutors have with those charged.  Charging 
the adversary also may implicate Standard 3-4.4(b)(ii), “[i]n exercising 
discretion to file and maintain charges, the prosecutor should not consider: 
hostility or personal animus towards a potential subject, or any other 
improper motive of the prosecutor . . . .”100 The current standards are 
insufficient to consider the nature of the adversarial relationship between the 
prosecutor and the defense attorney.  
How Prosecutorial Conflicts of Interest Are Identified and Addressed  
A way to examine the legitimacy of such prosecutions is to determine 
whether the investigating and charging of opposing counsel rise to the level 
of a prosecutorial conflict of interest.  As discussed earlier, prosecutorial 
conflicts of interest are viewed differently from conflicts that arise from 
representation of a client.101  
Beyond the guidance provided in the ABA Model Rules and Criminal 
Standards for the Prosecution Function, Bruce A. Green and Rebecca Roiphe 
categorize prosecutorial conflicts that are not enumerated or easily identified 
as such.  They group these conflicts in three ways: disinterestedness, 
pervasive individual conflicts, and institutional conflicts.102  Under these 
definitions, the prosecution of a defense attorney may fall under any of these 
categories.  
First, the close personal or professional relationships that prosecutors 
have to the accused primarily constitute conflicts to “disinterestedness” 
when they present risk of bias or favoritism against the defendant.103  These 
direct person-to-person relationships are the kind of conflicts identified in 
the Criminal Standards for the Prosecution Function.104  Here, the adversarial 
relationship between the line prosecutor and the defense attorney calls into 
question the prosecutor’s disinterestedness, when it is the prosecutor who 
 
 100. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.4(b)(ii).  
 101. Rethinking Prosecutor’s Conflicts, supra note 12, at 469.  
 102. Id. at 473.  
 103. Id. at 471. 
 104. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.7. 
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initiates an investigation of the defense attorney.  After all, it is the 
prosecutor who is pursuing charges against the defense attorney and the 
original defendant.  
Second, “[p]ervasive individual conflicts arise out of commonly shared 
personal interests that may influence the decision-making of all prosecutors 
in an office.”105  A prosecution may attract media attention and thus bolster 
the political nature of a prosecutor’s job.106  Of course, such media attention 
may also lead to a backlash against the prosecutor’s office, and thus, 
complicate the chief prosecutor’s re-electability. Beyond political 
considerations, line deputy prosecutors not involved with the prosecution at 
issue may nevertheless have an interest because of negative past interactions 
they had with the specific defense attorney that did not rise to unethical or 
unlawful conduct at the time.107  
Third, the institutional conflicts category considers the individual line 
prosecutor’s relationship to the particular prosecutor’s office, and even their 
identity as a prosecutor, “rather than any personal interest or relationship to 
another party.”108  Green and Roiphe argue, “an institutional conflict may be 
said to exist in cases where the prosecutor’s office is, or perceives itself to 
be, the victim.”109  They directly refer to prosecutions of perjury and 
obstruction of justice.110  “Perceiving that the office has an institutional 
interest in avenging the wrong, a prosecutor may proceed more zealously or 
harshly than in a similar case where a different prosecutor’s office was the 
victim.”111  Protecting the integrity of the institution includes prosecuting 
defense counsel who stepped outside of ethical and lawful bounds and 
illegitimately interfered with a prosecution.  
Such prosecutions raise questions of illegitimate interestedness in all 
three categories Green and Roiphe described due to the relationship between 
the line prosecutor and the criminal defendant, the line prosecutor and the 
defense counsel of the original defendant who is now being prosecuted, and 
 
 105. Rethinking Prosecutor’s Conflicts, supra note 12, at 471. 
 106. See Hasselle, supra note 1; see also Prosecuted by Her Legal Counterpart, supra note 
1; see also Laird, supra note 1; see also Vaughn, supra note 1; see also Sullivan, supra note 
6; see also Bammer, supra note 6. 
 107. Repeat players in the same courtroom means prosecutors and defense counsel may 
have long-term relationships. Contra Rethinking Prosecutor’s Conflicts, supra note 12, at 
474-75 (“any prosecutors who work regularly with police officers in the jurisdiction had a 
personal interest in favoring the police officers who were on trial, in order to remain in other 
officers’ good graces.”). 
 108. Id. at 471. 
 109. Id. at 479.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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the two line prosecutors in both cases.  
Green and Roiphe also acknowledge the challenge of addressing 
conflicts.  After all, not every conflict “necessarily skew[s] the prosecutors’ 
judgment” such that the alleged conflict of interest requires action.112  
Nonetheless, identifying and mitigating that conflict is difficult considering 
the role of the prosecutor in society and the limited checks on prosecutorial 
discretion.  “Like other public officials with ultimate decision-making 
authority, the chief prosecutor has broad discretion in determining the public 
interest and extremely limited oversight in the exercise of that discretion.”113  
It is this expansive power, in which prosecutors are not beholden to any one 
specific client, that leads the loyalty of a prosecutor to be ambiguous and 
complicated to identify.114  The basis of prosecutorial decision-making is the 
prosecutors’ “fiduciary obligation to act in the public interest, not in 
furtherance of any private interests, including their own.”115  Regulating 
adherence to such obligation is difficult because most decisions to effectuate 
justice are “judicially unreviewable.”116  If a conflict exists, then the 
prosecutor must decide whether it would be permissible to proceed with the 
case.  Given that the guiding standards to identify a prosecutorial conflict are 
lacking, there is a question of whether prosecutors are equipped to identify 
such conflicts that may not be so readily apparent.  
Indeed, scholars who have examined prosecutorial “refusals to recuse 
themselves have . . . found that an actor’s own assessment of her partiality is 
not reliable for a number of reasons having nothing to do with her conscious 
motives.”117  Kate Levine theorizes how unconscious biases can “infect a 
forward-looking decision about a conflict, as well as a backward-looking 
justification for a refusal to recuse oneself from a case or representation.”118  
A personal bias, or even a bias of an office, would hinder judgment calls that 
normally are part of the broad discretion of a prosecutor’s office.  As such, a 
clearer standard articulated in a nationally recognized guide to prosecutorial 
ethics would assist prosecutors in identifying when a conflict does exist so 
they can act appropriately. 
 
 112. Id. at 484. 
 113. Id. at 470. 
 114. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.3; see also 
Rethinking Prosecutor’s Conflicts, supra note 12, at 471. 
 115. Rethinking Prosecutor’s Conflicts, supra note 12, at 471. 
 116. Id. at 472. 
 117. Kate Levine, Who Shouldn't Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447, 1462 
(2016). 
 118. Id. at 1463. 
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A Proposed Standard  
Once a conflict is identified, the question then turns to what happens 
next given that the prosecutor does not have a client who can waive such a 
conflict.  Considering the prosecutor’s immense power to charge cases, even 
if that power is tempered by the guidance of the Criminal Standards that “the 
prosecutor is not obliged to file or maintain all criminal charges which the 
evidence might support,” the Standards should adopt a new standard nested 
in its section on “Conflicts of Interest.”119  This Note proposes the following 
standard: 
When the prosecutor wishes to initiate criminal proceedings for conduct 
arising from legal representation against an attorney or a member of the legal 
team representing the accused in a matter in which the prosecutor previously 
participated or currently participates in as a prosecutor, a conflict of interest 
arises.  This conflict of interest should be non-waivable and imputed to the 
entire office, absent a meaningful and enforced ethical firewall.  Without a 
firewall, the prosecutor should recuse its office from further participation in 
the matter. 
The accusing prosecutor’s office thus would not lead or conduct the 
investigation, the pleadings, litigation, or resolution of the criminal case 
against the accused, unless the conflict could be first resolved. 
This language is adopted from already-existing standards,120 and 
worded in consideration of general drafting guidelines the task force formed 
to consider revisions to the Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution 
and Defense Functions.121  Such a proposed standard is supported by existing 
standards and ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  For example, the 
standard is similar to the existing Standard 3-1.7(h), but further articulates 
the specific relationship the prosecutor has with the accused.  It also 
acknowledges that the charges stem from an adversarial professional 
relationship the prosecutor has with the accused.  
Furthermore, imputing the conflict to the entire office is supported by 
the ABA Model Rules on imputation,122 as well as practices of defense 
 
 119. See generally Rita M. Glavin, Prosecutors Who Disclose Prosecutorial Information 
for Literary or Media Purposes: What About the Duty of Confidentiality?, 63 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1809 (1999) (proposing new standards for the ABA Model Rules). 
 120. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.7(a), 3-1.7(c).  
 121. Rory K. Little, The ABA’s Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the 
Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1115-18 (2011) (“1. Do Not 
Change Existing Language or Structure Unless You Have To . . . . 2. Do Not Say Too Much, 
or Try for Too Much Detail, in a Standard . . . . 3. Restatement, Best Practices, or 
Aspirational?”).  
 122. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.10. 
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offices when faced with conflicts of interest due to relationships.123  Public 
defender offices will declare a conflict that cannot be resolved by an ethical 
firewall when the complaining witness or percipient witness is an employee 
of the office or a close family member of an employee of the office.124  Such 
offices may also declare a conflict when one attorney in a defense counsel 
office would otherwise have to call another attorney in the office to testify 
for the client.125  Here, the complainant or percipient witness is the prosecutor 
who raised the concern about the alleged violation of the law.  The head 
prosecutor would have the ability to impose ethical firewalls, but a firewall 
may not be practicable as discussed below.  
Imputing the conflict to the entire office would mean recusal of the 
office from the prosecution.  In a related argument, Levine also suggests 
office-wide recusal in prosecutions of police officers.126  The dependent 
relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement of the same county 
raises “cognitive biases and political pressures” that complicates the 
prosecutor’s decision-making regarding removal.127  Green and Roiphe 
specifically address Levine’s concerns about such per se removal: they 
view the prosecutor-police relationship not as one in which “prosecutors’ 
judgment might be skewed because of a relationship of particular officers 
under investigation but that the prosecutors have some particular 
sympathy toward police officers in general.”128  In contrast, here, the 
considerations of the existence of conflicts are not limited to the general 
adversarial relationship between prosecutors and defense attorneys due 
 
 123. See, e.g., People v. Singer, 226 Cal. App. 3d 23, 39 (1990) (where defense counsel’s 
sexual relationship with defendant’s wife “deprived defendant of his constitutional right to 
the ‘undivided loyalty and effort’ of his attorney.”). 
 124. See, e.g., KING COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENSE CONFLICTS WORK GROUP, CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST CASE ANALYSIS PROTOCOLS, § 4.11 (June 18, 2013), https://kingcounty.gov/~/ 
media/Council/documents/Issues/PDAT/ConflictsPolicyV15.ashx (“If an employee of the 
firm is a current witness for the prosecution, the firm may not represent the defendant or 
any other witness.”); Kimberly Veklerov & Jenna Lyons, Colleagues Mourn Marla 
Zamora; Grandnephew Arraigned for Murder, S.F. CHRON. (May 11, 2016), https://www. 
sfgate.com/ crime/article/Colleagues-mourn-Marla-Zamora-as-grandnephew-7463194.php 
(“[C]onflicts of interest were declared by both the public defender’s office and the San 
Francisco panel usually assigned in lieu of the former, given that so many in both 
departments had worked closely with Marla Zamora [past Chief Attorney of the San 
Francisco’s Public Defender’s Office] over the years.”); State v. Reedy, 352 S.E.2d 158, 
164 (W. Va. 1986) (“Nondisclosure of the family relationship in this case has denied the 
defendant his right to effective assistance of counsel.”); see generally, STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.3 (j).  
 125. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.7 cmt. 7 (“Lawyer as a Witness – Comment”). 
 126. Levine, supra note 117, at 1488.  
 127. Id. at 1487. 
 128. Rethinking Prosecutor’s Conflicts, supra note 12, at 508. 
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to the nature of their work. 
The focus of these prosecutions is the specific relationship one line 
deputy in this prosecutor’s office has with the defense counsel, or possibly, 
the specific relationships many line deputies have with this particular 
defense counsel.  The evidence supporting such allegations comes directly 
from the prosecution of the defense counsel’s client.  The line deputy or 
employee of the prosecutor’s office may become government witnesses. The 
defense of the defense-attorney-now-defendant may reveal information 
about the first client, which may assist the prosecution of the first client.129  
The prosecutors’ judgment may be compromised because of the prosecutors’ 
relationship to this particular defense attorney and the attorney’s 
representation of the first client.  As such, a proposed standard would provide 
guidance to prosecution offices on who may prosecute such cases.  
Implementation of Proposed Standard   
When an accused is a member of a defense legal team, and the charges 
stem from the accused’s participation in the representation of a criminal 
defendant, the prosecutor should declare a conflict.  The conflict should be 
imputed to the entire office.  Prosecutors could then argue that imputation of 
the conflict should be limited, and not extended to the entire office if one of 
two situations apply: first, physical distance may be sufficient to create an 
ethical firewall between the office of the prosecutor who first suspected the 
alleged misconduct and other parts of the office.  Some offices, or state-wide 
offices, cover large areas of geography and prosecutors in one office will 
rarely appear in the same cases opposing the defense attorneys in question.130  
This argument is less compelling, however, in local prosecutor’s offices 
where the county is small in size, the office has few attorneys, or where the 
office has a tightly-knit community of line deputies where the attorneys 
freely discuss cases either in person or by electronic communications.  
Another possible but unsatisfying solution may be organizing the office 
 
 129. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(5) (“A lawyer may reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary . . . to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the 
lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in 
any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client . . . .”). 
 130. Even though the United States Department of Justice is considered one office or firm, 
assistant district attorneys from separate federal districts are partitioned off from one another 
enough to dissipate any ethical concerns surrounding conflicts. See William R. Coulson, 
Takeaways from Rare Perjury Prosecution of Attorneys, LAW360 (Aug. 31, 2015), https:// 
www.law360.com/articles/696892/takeaways-from-rare-perjury-prosecution-of-attorneys; 
see also People v. Hernandez, 235 Cal. App. 3d 674, 681 (1991) (“the problems of insulating 
the case against Hernandez from the case against Braverman are not insurmountable-not in a 
prosecuting agency comprised of some 900 attorneys.”). 
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to create distinct and separate units.  A prosecutor from one part of an office 
may legitimately prosecute defense counsel if the office was partitioned off 
in the way H. Richard Uvillar proposes in The Neutral Prosecutor.131  Uvillar 
argues that the investigation and adjudication part of an office, where 
prosecutors investigate allegations before criminal charges are filed and 
decide the appropriate punishment for such charges, can and should be 
staffed by prosecutors separate from the adversarial process of litigating 
motions and trial.132  
This strategy has been supported by Rachel Barkow through the context 
of administrative law. Barkow suggests that this type of detachment would 
be viable to “curb abuses of power through separation-of-functions 
requirements and greater attention to supervision.”133  Such a detachment 
may also work to implement and maintain an effective ethical firewall in 
order to keep these cases within the same office. Attorneys in the 
Investigation and Adjudication sections of the office would not currently be 
in adversarial positions with defense attorneys.  A more detached 
investigation and adjudication section and a well-implemented firewall may 
be sufficient to remove the taint of an appearance of impropriety in charging 
because the prosecutors investigating the defense counsel would not have a 
professional relationship with the accused.  
Depending on the nature and size of an office, however, all the 
prosecutors of such an office may be situated to have judgment-affecting 
professional relationships with the prosecutor who may become a witness or 
the accuser.  Furthermore, the prosecutor in the Investigation section may 
have also been the prosecutor, or a colleague of the prosecutor, who 
investigated the case in which the alleged attorney misconduct occurred.  
Regardless of personal relationships prosecutors may have with the line 
deputy of the first case or the defense-attorney defendant in the second case, 
Green and Roiphe criticize the detached unit approach by recognizing the 
expectation that prosecutors are to “act as investigators, litigators, and 
gatekeepers at the same time.”134  Separating these roles reduces the efficacy 
of the person doing the job because distinctive functions would mean some 
prosecutors involved with the case would be less familiar with the facts than 
 
 131. Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor, supra note 20, at 1716. 
 132. Id. at 1716; see also Rethinking Prosecutor’s Conflicts, supra note 12, at 502 (“the 
investigative, charging, and trial functions are combined in a single prosecutorial office, with 
the result that prosecutors at the trial stage have conflicts arising out of their investigating and 
charging rule . . . .”).  
 133. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons 
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 873 (2009). 
 134. Rethinking Prosecutor’s Conflicts, supra note 12, at 511. 
5 - Yan_HJCP1-1.docx 12/5/2019  1:58 PM 
162 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 1:1 
other prosecutors.135 Furthermore, such a structural change to an office 
would require greater consideration than what is proportionate for the rare 
instance of charging defense counsel.  Considering all of these factors, it is 
likely that even prosecutors in a detached investigation section would not 
survive an inquiry into whether an ethical firewall is sufficient.  
If an ethical firewall is insufficient, then the prosecutor’s office has 
other options to prosecute defense counsel or a legal team member: passing 
the case to a special prosecutor, the state-level Office of Attorney General, 
or a local prosecutor’s office in a different county.136  First, the accusing 
prosecutor’s office could bring in a special prosecutor.137  The office and the 
special prosecutor would be guided by Standard 3-2.1, which discusses the 
best practices of how to secure and support a special prosecutor.138  This 
independent prosecutor would interview the prosecutor making the 
allegations against defense counsel, as well as relevant witnesses, and review 
the evidence before making a decision to charge. The attorney would also 
pursue the case throughout the criminal proceedings against the accused.  
If it were impracticable or too expensive for the prosecutor’s office to 
hire a special prosecutor, however, then the accusing office would need to 
recuse itself completely.  It may involve the state Office of the Attorney 
General (“AG’s Office”) or a county-level prosecutor’s office in a different 
jurisdiction. The accusing prosecution office would make a preliminary 
determination that some conduct or incident should be investigated for 
alleged misconduct arising from legal representation. Other than that, the 
office would pass the case to another prosecutorial agency.  The AG’s Office 
would be responsible for reviewing the evidence collected, doing an 
independent investigation, and assessing whether charges should be filed.  
 
 135. Id. at 510-11. 
 136. Having a neighboring county prosecutor’s office prosecute a defense attorney may 
also raise ethical concerns especially with Standard 3-1.7(f), as defense attorneys may practice 
in multiple counties.  While that second prosecutor’s office would have not been involved 
with prosecuting the case from which the alleged misconduct arose, attorneys in that office 
may still have an adversarial and professional relationship with the defense counsel.  
Furthermore, prosecutors in other offices may “pursue these cases harshly out of appreciation 
for the impediment that perjury imposes for their work and out of some sense of identification 
for the victimized office.”  Rethinking Prosecutor’s Conflicts, supra note 12, at 479, n.71.  To 
address this concern, the AG’s Office should be involved and make the determination of 
whether the AG’s Office can handle the case or if it can ethically be passed off to another 
county-level prosecutor’s office.  
 137. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-2.1 (“If a particular 
matter requires the appointment of a special prosecutor from outside the office, adequate 
funding for this purpose should be made available. Such special prosecutors should know and 
are governed by applicable conflict of interest standards for prosecutors.”).  
 138. See id. 
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It would then decide either to file the charges in the county where the 
alleged conduct occurred and send an assistant attorney general to 
prosecute the case there or charge the case in a nearby county and assign 
that local prosecutor’s office to prosecute the case.  If a county-level 
prosecutor’s office picked up the case, then that office would follow its 
regular procedures in investigating the case.  This process would allow the 
attorneys to decide to charge or prosecute the case without interviewing or 
reviewing statements or documents from a colleague or coworker.  In 
severing the commencement and investigation stages by empowering a 
separate office to pursue the charges, these procedures reflect some degree 
of detachment to the threat to prosecute defense counsel without creating a 
rigid process or structure for all cases.  
While Green and Roiphe criticize the use of a separate prosecutor to 
address conflicts of interest, their criticism specifically addresses 
prosecutions of law enforcement and of a political nature (e.g., where the 
defendant is a politician that controls the prosecutor’s office’s budget).139  As 
discussed above, a separate prosecutor’s office may be inappropriate for 
prosecutions of police officers because the conflict or bias comes from 
whether sympathy for police officers is legitimate. “Conceptualizing 
conflicts of interest to incorporate personal predispositions built up over a 
lifetime of experiences and education, possibly including professional 
interaction with police, is impractical.”140  Green and Roiphe do support the 
employment, however, of a separate prosecutor in prosecutions in which the 
prosecution’s office views itself to be the victim: “a prosecutor who is further 
removed from the case where the wrongdoing occurred is likely to look at 
the conduct somewhat more dispassionately and objectively—i.e., 
disinterestedly.”141  But a separate office’s distance from the legal 
community which encompasses both the originating prosecutor and defense 
attorney may also dilute the disinterestedness Green and Roiphe identify 
elsewhere.  Here, a separate office uninvolved with the first prosecution 
would support the prosecuting attorney’s disinterestedness and mitigate any 
appearance that prosecutors are improperly pursuing their opposing counsel.  
If an investigation by the separate prosecutor leads to charging the defense 
counsel, then a separate office’s decision may mollify Gershman’s concerns 
about the legitimacy of threats and bullying.   
This process may involve more resources to justly prosecute the case 
which may also in turn invoke concerns about special treatment.  The extra 
scrutiny this kind of case should undergo does require extensive resources 
 
 139. Rethinking Prosecutor’s Conflicts, supra note 12, at 511. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 479, n.71. 
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that the accusing prosecution’s office or receiving office may not have. 
These procedures are necessary, however, to address the conflict of interest 
arising from the close adversarial and professional relationships prosecutors 
and defense attorneys have because the procedures create a separation that 
avoids the appearance of impropriety and perhaps even legitimizes the 
decision to prosecute opposing counsel.   
Furthermore, the consumption of resources should be considered.  The 
Standards suggest that prosecution offices should contemplate “the fair and 
efficient distribution of limited prosecutorial resources” when making 
charging decisions.142  If the consumption of resources by this other office 
becomes untenable, then the accusing prosecutors still have recourse. 
Prosecutors can report the defense attorney to the state bar disciplinary 
committee even if charges are not filed.143  The defense attorney would then 
still be investigated. If the committee found merit in the report, the attorney 
could be possibly disciplined. An investigation by the state bar disciplinary 
committee, the AG’s Office, or even a neighboring county prosecutor’s 
office would create a more just process because the prosecution by a separate 
and distinct entity would raise less suspicion of a biased or conflicted 
prosecution.  The accused, the local bar, as well as the public, all have an 
interest in the fair administration of the criminal justice system.  
It is important to balance the constitutional rights of criminal defendants 
and the rights of their attorneys-now-defendants with the professional 
responsibilities of prosecutors.144  An addition to the Standards provides 
guidance in reconciling the legitimate pursuit of justice to charge defense 
lawyers who cross the line in advocating for their clients with an 
overreaching prosecutor’s use of their charging power against defense 
lawyers. 
Conclusion 
The ABA Model Rules and the Criminal Standards for the Prosecution 
and Defense Functions guide prosecutors and defense counsel in the ethical 
conduct required and expected of criminal justice attorneys.  Both sides, 
prosecutors and defense attorneys, can cross over into the outer boundaries 
 
 142. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.4(a)(xiv). 
 143. See, e.g., Jeff Adachi & Peter Calloway, One Simple Way to Hold Bad Prosecutors 
Accountable, THE APPEAL (Mar. 21, 2019), https://theappeal.org/prosecutorial-misconduct-
jeff-adachi-commentary; Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys 
to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 1059, 1061 (2009). 
 144. Threats and Bullying, supra note 11, at 340 (“Also illegitimate are threats that appear 
to have no recognizable law-enforcement purpose except to punish or deter persons from 
exercising their constitutional rights.”). 
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of ethical behavior.  It is the prosecutor, however, who has the sole power to 
use criminal charges to address conduct that veers too close to those 
boundaries.  This behavior is akin to the different examples of threats and 
bullying Gershman discusses.  It is also similar to the framework he employs 
to understand the legitimacy of prosecutorial conduct to incentivize or 
compel assistance to the prosecutor’s case at the expense of the interests or 
representation of criminal defendants.  Gershman does not, however, address 
the legitimacy of charging defense counsel or the members of the defense 
legal team, and this Note has attempted to do so. 
Prosecutions of defense attorneys and members of defense legal teams 
for conduct relating to legal representation raise concerns about violations of 
due process and other constitutional rights of defendants and attorneys.  This 
Note looks to frameworks to understand existing platforms to guide 
prosecutorial ethical behavior and prosecutorial conflicts of interest.  This 
Note suggests a new standard to add to the Criminal Standards for the 
Prosecution Functions with which to guide prosecutors when considering 
filing charges against defense attorneys and members of the defense legal 
team.  The distancing of prosecutors from the pursuit of criminal charges 
against their own opposing counsel may alleviate concerns of retaliation and 
other improprieties.  If the prosecutorial conflict of interest that arises during 
such a prosecution is fully considered and appropriately acted upon, pursuing 
attorney misconduct as criminal misconduct may be permissible.  A full 
consideration to ensure the fair administration of justice and fair trials for the 
original defendant and attorney must recognize the chilling effects of such 
prosecutions on the effective assistance of counsel for individuals accused 
of crimes. 
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